From a military history standpoint, it appears that the Cold War is stirring again; this time in Iran. Iran’s talks over their nuclear program is being proposed by Russia and scrutinized by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad stated ” Iran has taken steps to cooperate with the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency and now it is the turn of nations negotiating with Tehran to respond”. Russia’s proposition to the international community is that they make limited incentives to Iran for each step within the overall protocol towards proving it’s nuclear program is for peaceful purposes. Accusations from the international community about their nuclear program has been denied by Iran. The Russian proposal is under consultation by a team of experts (from the United States). One area under question is their nuclear program specifically uranium enrichment. Under uranium enrichment areas under consideration to determine weapons grade or non weapons grade (peaceful purposes) would be 1) viscosity, 2) centrifugal velocity, 3) time, 4) protocal – software, 5) temperature, 6) material (mixing), 7) location, 8) safety precautions, 9) storage containment, 10) clothing of personnel at these facilities, 11) security at the same facility, 12) shift rotation, 13) personnel shift rotations, and 14) designation codes (job descriptions) of these personnel at the various facilities (comparison) to name a few. Within the international community the cause for concern is that the Baltimore and other communities Iranian and Russian citizens would be drawn between not only their country’s politics, but how the United States and other countries reaction would be to this situation. Russia has always had a hot/cold relationship with Iran. Their politics are not distant from each other. Iran has also purchased technology (submarines, nuclear weapons, etc.) from Russia. Some alternate suggestions would be to; 1) have Russia and the international community work together on these incentives, 2) allow the Baltimore and other communities (Iranian, Russian, and others) comment or contact their elected officials, and/or families providing feedback to the proposal, 3) reconaissence flights (satellite, aircraft, civilian inspectors, etc.) to check the nuclear technology plants strategic placement around the country, 4) check the nuclear capability of Iran’s military forces (navy, etc.) (propulsion systems, manufacturing,etc.), 5) nuclear waste and dumping sites, 6) altered uranium (altered chemical structure), 7) alternatives to uranium and their capabilities, 8) simulation testing, and 9) close relationships and trade with other nations ( nuclear technology development elsewhere). One of the protocols of the stuxnet virus is to send messages back to it’s development team (imbedded software with protocol queries) outlining the electronic readings from the uranium enrichment centrifuges would be a good indication of nuclear or non nuclear weapons development.